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I International Business and Politics
"In our opinion, the most challenging issues facing MNCs
are those created by social-political institutions..."
(Citibank [uj )
"Thus the future American Business will require the highest
degree of sensitivity to the political framework in which
it functions and to the great coming changes in the World
political process."
(Kissinger [jl] )
While the political environment has always been an important factor in
international business, it has received increasing attention from both scholars
and practitioners in recent years. This higher level of political conscious-
ness reflects both the internationalization of production and post-war changes
In the structure of soclo/economic relationships.
Most unlnational firms are managed by local citizens who have an intui-
tive understanding of domestic politics. Although they certainly make serious
errors, they typically "know" how the system works and how one relates to it.
In addition, while domestic politics are important, the U.S. political system
(and that of many of the other major capital exporting countries) has been
quite stable in the past. Even though succeeding administrations may express
different views about the private sector, actual changes in policy have tended
to be those of degree rather than kind.
When the firm expands internationally, it faces political institutions
and political risks not encountered by its unlnational counterparts. Given
the need to conduct simultaneous operations in a large number of different en-
vironments, managers can no longer rely on an intuitive understanding of poli-
tics. Indeed, the implications of similar
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events may differ markedly from country to country. Second, many political
systems in which the firm operates may be a good deal less stable than that
of the home country: abrupt changes in policy may occur relatively frequently
and elicit little surprise. Thus, the manager venturing abroad may perceive
politics as both more important (in terms of achievement of the firm's ob-
jectives) and more difficult to deal with.
There has also been a tendency in the post-War era towards increased
politicization of the economic and social spheres. The vast majority of
governments now accept some responsibility for the socio-economic welfare
of their citizens and the need to execute policy to achieve that end. Further-
more, the mixed economy with some degree of direct government participation
in economic activity is now clearly the norm. These tendencies are obviously
related to the political mobilization of large segments of the world's popu-
lation resulting from the almost ubiquitous penetration of mass communications^
increasingly pervasive mass education and urbanization. There is broader
participation in national politics and greater "political" involvement in
"economic" activities.
While there has been increasing academic interest in the intersection
of politics and international business, it is still a relatively new and
loosely defined field. It would appear worthwhile to review and summarize
what has been accomplished thus far and to look towards future needs. This
paper will attempt to serve that end by focusing upon one of the more salient
issue areas; the political risk associated with foreign investment. It has
three e^-^'^ic objectives: to review the existing literature, to build upon
this literature by attempting to more precisely define the concept of poli-
tical risk, and to suggest fruitful directions for future research.
Thus, the next section will review existing conceptions of political
risk and Section III will discuss the subject in some depth and attempt
a redefinition. Sections IV, V and VI will review aspects of the litera-
i
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ture dealing with the assessment and evaluation of the impact of the poli-
tical environment upon foreign investors. Last, in Section VII, we will
attempt to draw conclusions and suggest some questions in need of research.
While recognizing their importance, we will not deal with the manage-
ment of political risk or with specific problems such as nationalization.
One final caveat. Although the paper attempts a comprehensive review of
the relevant literature, we certainly do not claim that it is exhaustive.
II Political Risk
"When you enter an endeavor unsuccessfully then the planning
was incorrect. The risk was above the gains and you stumble
along the way.... Sagacity, ingenuity, planning ... it in-
volves much weighing, odds against failure, odds against gain.
"I spent much time in jail. That's why I'm a student of the
matter."
(Doc Graham in Terkel [eoj )
The term "political risk" occurs frequently in the international business
literature. While its usage almost universally implies a possibility of un-
wanted consequences arising from political activity, there is certainly no
agreement on its precise meaning.
Many writers conceive of political risk in terms of (usually host) govern-
ment interference with business operations. Weston and Sorge's /^64j definition
is representative: "(P)olitical risks arise from the actions of national goverm
ments which interfere with or prevent business transactions, or change the terms
of agreements, or cause the confiscation of wholly or partially foreign owned
business property'.' (p. 60). Similarly, Baglini /^5_7 , Carlson /^llj , Eiteman
and Stonehill [lb]
,
Greene / 23] and The Journal of Commerce £28} all explicitly
define political risk as governmental or sovereign interference with business
operations.
While Lloyd's £417 view is a bit broader (circumstances changing in a way
that produces consequences for the firm), he notes that political risks are
primarily " _ .flection of the activity of governments. Smith J_56] and Aliber
[ij also, at least implicitly, define political risk in terms of government
policy towards foreign investors. The former constructs a model based upon
power elites and asks: "(W)ould the challenging pre-elite group be favorably
disposed towards continued foreign investment..." (p. 9). The latter is con-
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cerned with deposits denominated in a single currency in several countries
and concludes that those which are subject to the regulations of different
national authorities are subject to different political risks (p. 163). This
rather widespread conception of political risk in terms of government inter-
ference with private investment has important normative implications to which
we shall return in the next section.
Several authors view political risk in terms of "events," i.e., politi-
cal acts, constraints imposed on the firm or some combination of the two.
Green /l8, 20^ directly equates political instability with political risk.
Rodriguez and Carter /A?/ concentrate on expropriation (partial or total)
and exchange risk in the context of unstable LDCs. Van Agtmael /^62 / focuses
upon instability, nationalization (total and "creeping") and external poli-
tical change. Hershbarger and Noerager /27j list property damage, expropri-
ation, government interference with existing contracts, exchange controls,
discriminatory taxation and regulation.
Nehrt l44 / conceives the investment climate as composed of a business
climate (economic, social and administrative environments) and a political
climate (p. 2). He then defines the latter in terms of the risk of national-
ization or expropriation, what may be called creeping expropriation, and
future direct competition from public enterprise.
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Other authors are difficult to categorize. Brooke and Renmers [9], for
example, do not define political risk, per se, but point out that the MNE is
subject to multiple political (and economic) oystems, each with attendant control
and risks. Dymsza [14] suggests that because of the interrelationships between
the political, legal, economic, and cultural environments a composite risk factor
be constituted. Zink [66] categorizes political risk in terms of events detrimer
to all business enterprise and those detrimental
to foreign investors. The former are seen as related to system stability, the
latter to host government policy. Last, Daniels et al. [13] merely note that one
of the major concerns of international firms is the possibility that a deteriora-
tion of the political climate will effect their operating positions (p. 353).
Three authors have considered the concept of political risk in consider-
able detail: Robock, Root, and Haendel and West. Robock ^46j suggests the
following operational definition:
"...political risk in international business exists (1)
when discontinuities occur in the business environoient
,
(2) when they are difficult to anticipate and (3) when
they result from political change. To constitute a "risk"
these changes in the business environment roust have the
potential for significantly affecting the profit or other
goals of a particular enterprise'.* (p. 7)
.
The concepts of discontinuity and direct effects on the enterprise are
central to Robock' s definition. He notes that while all political environ-
ments are dynamic, changes whith are gradual and progressive and are neither
unexpected nor difficult to anticipate do not constitute political risk. While
In some cases it, "... becomes difficult to draw the line between continuity
and discontinuity ..." (p. 8), it is clearly the latter which provides the
basis for political risk.
Perhaps most importantly, Robock clearly differentiates between political
Instability and political risk; "... political fluctuations which do not change
the business environment significantly do not represent risk for international
business .... Political instability, depending upon how it is defined, is a
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separate although related phenomenon from that of political risk" (p. 8).
Robock also considers political risk as industry or even firm specific
rather than as an aggregate phenomenon. He distinguishes between "macro
risk" where political events result on constraints on all foreign enterprise
(e.g. Cuba in 1959-60) and "micro risk" which affects only "... selected
fields of business activity or foreign enterprises with specific character-
istics" (p. 9).
Last, Robock makes two other important points. First, that the domain
of political risk extends beyond LDC host countries to industrialized and/or
home countries. Second, that political risks can result in gains as well as
losses; in insurance terminology the possibility of "speculative" as well as
pure risks exists.
Root /50_/ defines political risk in terms of the:
"... possible occurence of a political event of any kind
(such as war, revolution, coup d'etat, expropriation,
taxation, devaluation, exchange controls and import re-
strictions) at home or abroad that can cause a loss of
profit potential and/or assets in an international business
operation" (355).
Root emphasizes the distinction between uncertainty and risk (a distinc-
tion with normative as well as positive implications), attempts to distinguish
between political and other environmental risks and develops several useful
taxonomies.
Political events are differentiated from social or economic events in
terms of their motivating force or direction; the former result from either
government action or bear on a nation's political authority (p. 355). However,
in a subsequent paper [51 J Root concludes that the distinction between political
and economic risks breaks down at the experiential level as a result of the
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"... interdependence of economic and political phenomena" (p. 3). Still, an
attempt at that distinction is made; "(A)n uncertainty is political if it
relates to (a) a potential government act ..., or (b) general instability
in the political/social system" (p. 4).
Root also develops two useful taxonomies. First, political uncer-
tainties are categorized in terms of the manner in which they affect the
firm; (1) transfer -- uncertainty about flows of capital, payments, tech-
nology, people, etc., (2) operational -- uncertainties about policies which
directly constrain local operations, and (3) ownership/control -- uncertain-
ties about policies relating to ownership and/or managerial control (p. 357).
Second, Root distinguishes between political/economic risks associated with
host government actions that are primarily a response to (largely unantici-
pated) changes in the national economy, and political/social risks which
are related to the host governments' response to non-economic change. The
two typologies are related: transfer and operations uncertainties flow
primarily from political/economic events and ownership/control from political/
social.
Haendel and West / 2Uj focus upon a distinction between risk and uncertainty
between "... the probability of occurrence of an undesired political event(s)
and the uncertainty generated by inadequate information concerning the occurrenc
of such an event(s)," (p. 44). Thus political risk is defined as the "... risk
or probability of occurrence of some political event(8) that will change the
prospects for the profitability of a given investment," (p. xi) . (They later
explicitly note that political risk is both Investor and investment specific.)
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The crux of their argtiraent is that information -- in this case inform-
ation about the political environment -- can help bridge the gap; it can
enable investors to convert uncertainty to risk which is, at least potentially,
"... measurable, insurable and avoidable," (p. 46). We shall pursue this
line of reasoning in the next section.
10.
Ill Political Risk: a reconsideration
In section V of this paper we conclude that international firms' under-
standing of the concept of political risk, their assessment and evaluation of
politics, and the manner in which they integrate political information into
decision making are all rather general, subjective and superficial. We would
argue that while the literature reflects substantial progress in a relatively
short period of time, it still does not provide an analytic framework which can
adequately contribute -- in either a taxonomic or an operational sense -- to
improved practice.
As noted above, many authors simply view political risk in terms of an
even occurring either in the environment (e.g. instability) or at the junction
of environment and enterprise (e.g. a nationalization), typically associated
with an act of government, that has unfavorable consequences for the firm.
Those who have explored the issue in more depth ^2U, 44, 46, 50^/ clearly dis-
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tinguish between the political event and the actual loss or gain to the firm.
They note that any given political event may have favorable, unfavorable or
perhaps no consequences for foreign investors depending upon its nature, the
conditions under which it occurs, and the characteristics of the specific
investment in question.
However, the existing "state of the art" places limitations on operation-
alization in the context of the investment (or re- investment) decision process.
First, the phenomenon is not defined in a manner that allows for unambiguous
classification of environmental events; i.e. which are of concern and which
are not. oecor.d, while all of the authors mentioned directly above (and L12 j )
deal with uncertainty in terms of both environmental processes (continuous
versus discontinuous change) and decision makers' perceptions (uncertainty
versus risk) the two are not explicitly linked in a manner which facilitates
integration into investment decision making. Third, the concentration on
discontinuous change and/or uncertainty unnecessarily limits the scope of
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political analysis. Last, the emphasis on the negative consequences of
government "intervention" entails an implicit normative assumption that may
not be universally valid.
This paper certainly will not resolve, or even attempt to resolve, all of
these problems. However, we will attempt to build upon the existing literture
to more explicitly delineate the concept of political risk. Our ultimate ob-
jective is normative; to further develop the concept so as to allow for more
precise statements as to how firms should analyze and evaluate politics and
integrate political information into the decision making process.
This section will first focus upon environmental phenomena of direct concern.
It will then explore the interactions or links between the political environment
and the firm, focusing upon the perception of environmental events by decision
makers. Last, the impact of political events upon the firm and the integra-
tion of assessments of that impact into decision making will be discussed.
The political environment
All firms interact with almost all dimensions of the environment in which
they operate. While economic, political, social, cultural, legal, and physi-
cal aspects of the environment may be analytically distinct in the mind of
the social scientist, we would have to agree with Root that these distinctions
then to break down at the experiential level. Society exists in its entirety;
"The power process (i.e., politics) is not a distinct and separable part of
the social process, but only the political aspect of an interactive whole"
Lasswell and Kaplan |^39j, p. xvii.
This most certainly applies to the two aspects of the environment of
direct concern, economics and politics. "In all the political systems of the
world, much of politics is economics and most of economics is also politics.
What then is the difference between the two?" Lindblom [40_) . A fundamental
question is thus obvious, is there any reason to consider the political en-
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vironment separately; to distinguish political risk from other business risks
faced by the firm?
Gilpin /1 7y', among others, has argued that in the modern world the relation-
ship between politics and economics is not distinct and independent, but rather
interactive and reciprocal. Neither economic nor political factors alone are
sufficient to explain events / 8 / . The interdependence of economics and poli-
tics, however, does not mean that we cannot distinguish between rhem. In fact,
the distinction may depend on one's viewpoint, "Economics refers to activities,
which may simultaneously be political activities looked at in a particular way"
How then do we distinguish politics from economics? Politics clearly in-
volves power or authority, "... the political process is the shaping, distri-
bution and the exercise of power" Jji9 j , p. 75. While we talk of "corporate
politics" or "university politics," we generally utilize "political" in the
context of the whole society in which we live. "Political life concerns all
those varieties of activity that influence significantly the kind of author-
itative policy adopted for society..." jTlS/
, pp. 127 and 128.
At this point we can conclude that we are primarily concerned with power
or authority relationships at the societal or state level. "In an untidy pro-
cess called politics, people who want authority struggle to get it while
others try to control those who hold it" 1^0/ , p. 119. We are concerned
with attempts to get, maintain, or Increase power as determinants of events.
While actors would include both the government and opposition groups (large
and small, organized or disorganized), to be relevant to their acts must be
related to power at the level of the state.
Thus, we can distinguish between economic and political determinants of
events. First, at least in the short run, "... politics largely determines
the framework of economic activity..." /17J . A change in regime can result
in a change from a market to a socialist economy (Cuba in 1959) or the reverse
(Chile in 1973). I
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Second, and following from the first, political or power concerns often
influence economic policy. (The converse is, of course, equally true. The
production and distribution of wealth directly affects the distribution of
power.) An economic act or event (e.g., the U.S. government's imposition of
steel "trigger prices" in late 1977) can be motivated by the need to maintain
the power of the administration by preventing alienation of important interest
groups as well as by a petceived need to protect the productive apparatus.
We now can return to the basic question; is there any reason to differ-
entiate between political risk and other business risks faced by the firm.
We would suggest that there is, and for very pragmatic reasons. While society
may exist as a whole cloth, given human cognitive limitations, focusing on
woof and weave facilitates both analysis and practice. Economics and politics
are sufficiently distinct, both as abstract phenomena and in terms of their
impact upon the firm, to justify separate analysis and managerial response.
For example, a Japanese firm's response might be considerably different if it
believed that the U.S. imposition of steel "trigger prices" in 1977 was motiva-
ted by strict balance of payments concerns rather than the need to prevent
alienation of important interest groups.
We can utilize the concept of power relationships at the state level to
circumscribe the area of the investment environment of immediate interest.
We are concerned with events, whether they are manifest as political (authority
or power relationships) or economic (the production and distribution of wealth)
phenomena, that are motivated by attempts to attain, maintain or increase
power at the state level. Again, while the distinction has heuristic value,
it is clearly an ideal construct. Most, if net all, events we would ciasjify
as political have economic determinants and effects.
We would not, for example, consider a strike or^en a general strike a
political event if its motivation results from dissatisfaction over work-
related issues. However, wide scale strikes in Nicaragua in January 1978
protesting the Somoza regime were clearly political. Similarly, a general
strike in Tunis at about the same time began as an economic event — a protest
against wage restraints -- and ended as a full challenge to the Bausguiba
government
.
The environment and the firm: perceptions and impact
The firm exists as a system within an environment. Given our definition
of the relevant political environment, we need to pursue the second question
posed above. How do political events, which occur in the environment, affect
the firm? The answer depends, to a large extent, on the nature of the world
facing the firm. Three states of affairs -- in terms of the relationship
between events and outcomes -- are of interest.
In the first a single outcome can be unambiguously associated with a
given event; certainty exists. In the second, while certainty does not exist,
one has perfect knowledge of all possible outcomes associated with an event
re.
I
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and the probability of each occurring. In the third state of affairs, neither
knowledge of all possible outcomes nor "objective" probabilities (in the sense
used above) exisi. However, uncertainty is, following Shackle [54], bounded.
Decision makers can make judgements about most of- the important outcomes and
their likelihood of occurrence. (The fourth state of complete uncertainty is
not of Interest; it entails what Shackle calls a "powerless decision.")
It is clear that in the context of the kind of decisions we are concerned
with certainty is an ideal construct. The firm operates in a world of uncer-
tainty; it always faces the possibility that outcomes will differ from those
anticipated. The distinction between our second and third states-of-affairs,
which derives from one's ability to associate probabilities with outcomes, is
associated with Knight £^34j :
"The practical difference between the two categories, risk and un-
certainty, is that in the former the distribution of the outcome in
a group of instances is known (either through calculation a priori
or from statistics of past experience), while in the case of uncer-
tainty this is not true, the reason being in general that it is im-
possible to form a group of instances because the situation dealt
with is in a high degree unique" p. 233.
It should also be clear that for most business decisions the state Knight
defines as risk, the existence of discoverable and objective (in the sense that
they exist a priori; that all observers with perfect knowledge would agree upon
their values) probabilities is an ideal construct. "A cosmos in which outcomes hi
calcuable probabilities which men seek to discover and upon which they act
is a cosmos where in effect certainty and not uncertainty prevails...," [54/
, p.
First, most business decisions, and certainly the discrete and sequential
foreign direct investment decisions of immediate concern, are what both Knight
and Shackle refer to as unique events. They can neither be repeated nor div-
ided; i.e., treated as one of a series of experiments and pooled (as can both
deaths and auto accidents). Perhaps more importantly, the decisions are made
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by human beings in a very complex environment. It is far from clear that
all possible, or even all important, alternatives can be specified. As
decisions are taken in the present, possible outcomes must be imagined out-
comes, existing subjectively in the mind of the decision maker. "(T)he out-
comes, by comparison of which a decision is made, are fragments of the in-
dividual mind (no matter whether in some later activity they shall be ob-
served to have come true...)", Jj^^J , p. 10.
Let us return to our three states of affairs and the links between the
political environment and the firm. The first, where outcomes are known and
unambiguous, is certainty . To avoid semantic confusion (with terms such as
business or political risk), we shall call the second (where probabilities
are known) objective uncertainty . Last, the third state can be called, for
reasons which will become clear, bounded subjective uncertainty . Now, while
certainty and objective uncertainty are Ideal constructs, they can be, and at
times are, approximated in actuality.
Certainty can be approximated by situations when one outcome dominates
all others. Thus, the probability that the next President of the United
States will be selected by a constitutional process and that he (or she) will
not institute a program of broadscale nationalization of industry is so high
as to be virtually certain. Certainty may also be approximated in situations
that Robock )^6^/ described as gradual change which one can anticipate based
upon current trends.
Objective uncertainty can be approximated by situations where wH^io one
outcome does not dominate, all feasible outcomes are known, information is
readily available, and all (or almost all) observers agree upon probabilities.
Again, an example would be the outcome of most U.S. presidential elections.
Now, what is the impact of the political environment on the firm in each
of these states-of-affairs? Given certainty, the possibility that outcomes
will differ from those anticipated does not exist. The firm does not face
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business risk , the possible variation of returns from their expected values
(typically measured by the standard deviation ) [16], p. 363. Thus, under
conditions of certainty, political events can only affect the magnitude of
returns; they have no distribution. However if uncertainty exists (either
oJ>jective or subjective) political events can affect both what is now the expected
value of returns and their distribution; political events can contribute to
business risk.
Several additional points are in order. First, one can only say political
events may effect returns (either their expected value or distribution). As
many authors have noted ( e.g. [461 and [50]) whether they
do or not is a function of both environmental and firm (including industry
and/or project specific)factors. Second risk is a property of the firm not the
environment. It ±s^ the possible variation of a firm specific variable from its
expected value; it can be caused by environmental events. Third, risk may
imply positive as well as negative variation about the mean; it can result in
gains as well as losses. The distinction between "p-ire" risk which involves
only a chance of loss or no loss (e.g. a fire or fraud) and "speculative" risk
which Involves the possibility of both gain and loss [31] is useful.
The distinction between objective uncertainty and bounded subjective
uncertainty is also important. In the latter, uncertainty Is bounded in that all
their probabilities the most important and
possible outcomes and are not known; only opinions as to. their relative llkeli-
A /\
hood are available. Uncertainty is also subjective in that these opinions are
based upon decision makers perception's w^••-»• are in turn a function of the
information available to them, their previous experience and their individual
cognitive processes which synthesize both into an imagined future.
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The crucial point, and one which forces us to take Issue with the existing
literature (e.g., Haendel & West [24]), is that while better information
can help eliminate misconceptions about both the political environment and its
Impact upon the firm, it can seldom convert uncertainty into risk or what we hav<
called objective uncertainty. Opinions formed about future events, and perhaps
all perceptions of reality, are inherently subjective. Hannah Arendt [3] put
It well:
"...Nothing that appears manifests itself to a single viewer capable
of perceiving it under all its inherent aspects. The world appears
in the mode of It-seems-to-me, depending on particular perspectives
determined by location in the world as well as by particular organs
of perception. Not only does this produce error, which I can correct
by changing my location, drawing closer to what appears, or by improving
my Imagination to take other perspectives into account; it also gives
birth to true semblances - that is true deceptive appearances, which
I cannot correct like an error, since they are caused by my permanent,
location on the earth and remain bound up with my own existence as one
of the earth's appearances" (p. 108-109).
Thus, while given both objective and bounded subjective uncertainty the
political environment can affect both expected returns and their distribution
(i.e. business risk) its contribution to the latter differs in each state.
Let us assume that although the world exists In a state of objective uncertainty,,
it is manifest to the decision maker as bounded subjective uncertainty. An
omniscient observer would not be certain about unambiguous consequences of events*
but would be certain about the complete set of consequences and the probabilltiesi
attached to each. However he or she would also have available the perceptions of
each decision maker which would be a function of an Interaction between available
information and past experience (broadly defined), expressed in some sort of
probabilistic form.
/
Our omniscient observer then could calculate the difference between the
objective probabilities and the "subjective" probabilities of each decision maker
Part of the variance of this variable would be attributable to differences in
information and would presumeably be reduced through dlssemenatlon of similar
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(and hopefully more accurate) data. However part of the variance is a function
of differences in both the experience and cognitive processes of decision
makers and Is thus irreducible. We shall call this variance In the difference
between objective probabilities (as seen by our omniscient observer) and the
decision makers actual estimates of "probabilities" a subjectivity factor .
Under conditions of objective uncertainty the contribution of political
events to business risk is a function of only the events themselves. It is
the probability distribution of outcomes. However under conditions of bounded
subjective uncertainty the contribution of political events to risk is a function
of both the events and the subjectivity factor. Again, part of the difference
between "objective probabilities" (an ideal construct) and subjective perceptions
is due to a lack of information and part is due to the very nature of perception.
Thus the political environment contributes to risk both because of its uncertainty
(i.e. the probability distribution of outcomes) and the fact that decision makers
know that, regardless of the Information they have available, they can never
perceive that probability distribution directly. Their perceptions of it are
distorted
inherently by their past experience and cognitive processes. We would
suggest that the subjectivity factor is extremely important in international
business where managers must assess and evaluate stimuli arising in an alien culture
The term "political risk" appears overly constrained from both an analy-
tical and operational viewpoint. We are, or should be concerned with the
assessment of the nature of the political environment, the evaluation of its
Impact on the firm, and the integration of that information into decision
making. We are concerned with all relevant political events whether or not
their outcomes are evaluated under conditions of certainty or uncertainty,
whether their impact upon the firm is positive or negative. We would thus
propose that the impact of the environment upon the firm be evaluated in terms
of a continuum ranging from certainty to bounded subjective uncertainty.
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Integration into decision making
The third question posed at the beginning of this section involves
integration of political assessments into the decision making process. It
is not a subject which has been widely discussed as the literature typically
focuses upon deriving (typically probabalistic) estimates of
political events and/or their impact upon the firm rather than how the estimates
are utilized in the decision making (presumably a capital budgeting) process.
Primarily for reasons of a lack of competence in what is a very specialized
field, we will not make a major departure from this tradition.
without a great deal of discussion,
Most authors who have considered the problem assume, that decision makers
will utilize political analysis to adjust either cash flows or the discount
rate. Robock jj*()j , for example,
shows how risk analysis can be used to determine the political risks likely to
arise during specific time periods and then suggests that, '.'... the present
value of expected cash flows, or the internal rate of return from the investment
project under consideration can be adjusted to reflect the timing and magnitude
of the risk probabilities," p. 17. (In the example that follows, however, only
cash flows are adjusted.)
After reviewing evidence showing how most firms analyze political and
economic stability, Stobaugh [57] suggests tw more "sophisticated techniques,"
range of estimates and risk analysis. However while both provide probability
distributions as well as expected values of cash flows, Stobaugh' s examples
use environmental analysis only to adjust the level of the cash flows.
At least two authors have discussed the matter in some depth.
Stonehill and Nathanson [58] object to simple discount rate adjustments to
reflect political and foreign exchange uncertainties. "Use of a discount rate
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uniformly higher than the cost of capital ... does not allow for the actual
amounts at risk or for the time pattern of uncertainty." They suggest that
"A better way to allow for uncertainty in the multinational case would be to
charge each period's incremental cash flows the cost of a program of uncertain-
ty absorbtion for that period, whether or not the program was actually under-
taken" p. 46. The program of uncertainty absorbtion could entail the purchase
of additional information, insurance (including investment guarantees), hedging
and the like. They, in essence, recommend using a market determined approxi-
mation of a certainty equivalent.
Shapiro /^55_/ deals with political and economic risk, and specifically with
expropriation, in the context of the capital budgeting process. He notes that
neither of two methods (a higher discount rate or a shorter payback period)
commonly used to account for political or economic risk "... lends itself to
a careful evaluation of a particular risk's actual impact on Investment re-
turns. A thorough risk analysis requires an assessment of the magnitude of
the risk's effect on cash flows as well as an estimate of the true pattern
of the risk," p. 6.
Shapiro then develops sophisticated techniques for adjusting cash flows
given the probability of expropriation at a point in the future. However, he
assumes that (1) the assumptions of the capital asset pricing model are rele-
vant and (2) the risks in question are nonsystematic in nature. Thus the
cash flow adjustments reflect only changes in expected values resulting from
the impact of a given risk.
While we would agree with Shapiro that in evaluating the Impact of the
political environment on the firm both the effect upon the magnitude of cash
flows and on their distribution (i.e. risk) must be taken into account, we
would like to avoid entering the lists on the question of whether the firm
should be viewed as a social organization reflecting managerial utilities
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(and risk preferences) or as an agent of the stockholders. Thus, we would
suggest that the potential effect of politics be evaluated in terms of the
continum discussed above. Under conditions giving rise to risk, whether one
actually adjusts the discount rate or not will be determined by one's judg-
ment as to 1) the applicability of the Capital Asset Pricing Model and 2)
v^ether the risk is systematic or not.
Under conditions approximating certainty decision makers should be con-
cerned only with determining the effect of political events on the magnitude
of cash flows. Risk, clearly is not a relevant concern. However, political
assessment and evaluation is still necessary. Certain outcomes are not In-
herently obvious; they are certain given sufficient information about the
environment and the firm. The latter is quite Important, as vulnerability
to political change is likely to be firm or even project specific.
Under conditions approximating objective uncertainty, the decision maker
must consider the impact of politics on both the expected value of cash flows
and their distribution (or business risk). The estimate of the contribution
to risk will flow solely from the distribution of the joint probability of a
political event taking place and affecting cash flows. A possible example
might be France in 1978 where one could have assigned probabilities to the
likelihood of the left coming to power and the likelihood of one's industry
being nationalized If that outcome occurs. Last, under conditions of bounded
subjective uncertainty, the decision maker Is again concerned with the effect
of political events upon both expected values and risk. However, in this in-
stance risk is increased because one is uncertain about the shape of the prob-
ability distribution. In fact one knows one's estimate is Inherently distorted
due to subjective factors and that the distortion can never be completely eli-
minated.
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We thus are concerned with a process which involves the assessment of
the nature of the political environment, evaluation of the impact of that
environment upon the firm's operations, decision maker's perceptions of both
environmental events and their impacts and the integration of political assess-
ment and evaluation into the decision making process. One additional point
needs to be made, at least in brief. The evaluation of the impact of politics
upon foreign investment may entail implicit normative assumptions which are
counterproductive in terms of the very issue of concern. This problem is
exacerbated by the tendency to view political risk in terms of government
3interference with one's operations.
Much of the discussion of political risk appears to assume that govern-
mental restrictions on FDI, whether they involve partial divestment or local
content regulations, involve economically inefficient and perhaps even "irra-
tional" tampering with flows of direct investment which provide net benefits
to their recipients. While we can not discuss this issue in depth it should
be clear that the latter is less than universally accepted and that what ap-
4
pears as economic nationalism to an investor may be regarded as an attempt
to implement a policy of indigenous industrialization by the host. In short,
company and host country objectives differ and neither has a monopoly on
goodness and light. A perception to the contrary, whether explicit or implicit,
may well increase the risk one is attempting to evaluate.
At this point we will temporarily leave our examination of the concept of
political risk and resume our review of the literature. Section IV will exa- *
mine empirical studies which attempt to test for relationships between politi-
cal events (typically instability) and foreign direct investment. Section V
will review the sizeable literature describing how firms assess the political
environment and/or evaluate political risk. Section VI will then examine several
methodologies which have been developed to assess political risk. Last, after
drawing conclusions (VII) we will return to a redefinition of political risk.
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IV. Political Events and Foreign Direct Investment
This section will review empirical studies of the relationship between
foreign direct Investment (FDI) and environmental variables. First, a
methodological caveat Is necessary. All of the studies compare economic, social
and political Indicators across a very disparate group of countries. Furthermore,
quantification of non-economic variables poses significant conceptual and
methodological problems. Thus the raw data are typically weak In terms of both
accuracy and comparability and so limit conclusions that can be drawn from the
research. Last, all but one of the studies investigate what is obviously a
longitudenal phenomena cross-sectlonally, further exacerbating the usual problems
encountered when one attempts to establish causal relationships at the societal
level. In summary, while the research results discussed below are useful and
interesting, the results must be taken as very tentative.
Green conducted the first major empirical study of the relationship between
political instability and FDI with results reported in [7 and 19 J . The method-
ology Involved a cross sectional (1965) test of the relationship between stocks
of U.S. FDI in manufacturing and trade (book value) and an Index of political
instability across 46 developed and developing countries while controlling for
GNP/capita. The independent variable, the Feierabend and Feierabend index of
politically relevant agressive behaviors, includes 30 destabilizing events
compiled over a 16 year period (1948-65).
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Green concluded that political Instability did not affect the overall
allocation of U.S. marketing FDI [7], p. 185. Disaggregating into subsamples
of developed and less developed nations did not modify his findings. In fact
only when countries were disaggregated regionally was a significant relationship
established.
While it is not within the purview of this paper to extensively critique
the studies reviewed, two points should be noted. First, there are well known
problems with the Feierabend index. It is a composite measure which assigns
weights subjectively to events (to account for their intensity) and perhaps most
Importantly, scales nations on the basis of the most destabilizing event during
the time period in question. Second, it is difficult to interpret results in
the absence of other variables which might account for part of the variance of
FDI. However, Green's study was the first attempt to rigorously investigate the
Impact of political instability on FDI.
A second study by Green and Cunningham [20] attempted to overcome the
specification problem. Their methodology involved analysis of relationships
between two dependent variables — total and manufacturing (U.S.) FDI — and
eleven indices of potentially relevant environmental factors across a group of
25 developed and developing countries. The independent variables included
indices of market potential, political instability, cultural differences, infra-
structure, profitability and the like. Cross-sactional analysis
(a stepwise regression procedure) failed to establish a relationship
between indicators of political instability (the Feierabend index) and stocks of
FDI. The equation for total investment (r2 - .A6) included two measures of
market potential and an indicator of return on investment. The equation for
manufacturing FDI (R = .41) included only GNP.
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In a third analysis [22], Green and Smith did establish a statistically
significant relationship (Kendall's Tau - .33) between instability and a measure
of profitability of U.S. FDI (U.S. share in net earnings and branch profits as
a percentage of investment) in a group of 23 countries. However, analysis at
the sectoral level showed a positive relationship between earniiigs and stability
In mining and petroleum, but no significant relationship in manufacturing. As
manufacturing accounted for almost half of the investment existing in the 23
countries, and as the strong correlation observed in the mining sector (.87)
appears to be a function of a small sample (N - 6) and one large atypical outrider
(South Africa), it is difficult to know what to make of the findings.
Knickerbocker [33] analyzed the affect of environmental variables on patterns
of oligopolistic reaction. He regressed (using a. stepwise procedure) a measure
of entry concentration on nine environmental variables across a group of 21
developed and developing countries. The independent variable of Interest was
Sherbini's stability-cohesion index which included measures of Intra-country
violence, cultural fragmentation and years of sovereignty. The Sherbinl index, a
measure of oligopoly stability and the growth rate of GDP accounted for A9% of
the variance. Knickerbocker concluded that the positive relationship between
intensity of oligopolistic reaction and country stability indicates that "...
ologopolists were not inclined to make defensive investments in unstable markets,'
p. 184.
Root and Ahmed j52j utllired discriminant analysis to attempt to identify
the determinants of manufacturing FDI in do Lo^Cb. Countries were classified as
unattractive, moderately attractive, and highly attractive on the basis of per
capita inflows of non- extractive FDI (1966-70). Six of thirty-eight environ- I
mental variables Included in the study were found to be significant discriminatorff
GDP/caplta, GDP growth rate, economic integration, urbanization, commerce- transpor'
communication, and regular executive transfers.
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While the authors conclude that political instability is one of the
determinants of manufacturing FDI, regular executive transfers was the fifth
variable selected by the stepwise procedure and its exploratory power appears
weak. Although tha results are of interest, we would suggest that they again
confirm that the major determinants of FDI are market related and not political.'
In a rather complex study Thunel ^6l7attempted to analyze the relationship
between political instability and the investment decision process. Thunell's
investigation differed in several important respects from those reviewed thus
far. First, it was longitudenal (1948-67) rather than cross-sectional. Second, he
attempted to utilize flows, or rather changes in flows, of FDI as the dependent
variable. Third, he did not use a composite index of political stability. Based
on event data, he assembled a number of indicators roughly categorized as elite
and mass stability.
Thunell constructed a dependent variable based upon years in which there was
a major "trend" change in the flow of foreign investment (the second derivative).
For each of the independent variables (indices of stability) he then constructed
ratios of the mean number of events during years of positive trend change and the
mean number during years of negative trend change, each over the mean during years
of no change. Relationships were then described observationally.
An asymmetrical relationship was observed between political events and
major trend changes. A high level of mass violence preceeds negative trend
changes, while a low level of political instability is not sufficient to generate
a positive change. Rather, it was often accompanied by a government transfer
I
which Thunnel speculates implies a shift in policy.
Using a stepwise regression procedure on 1958 to 1967 data, Thunnel found
that 627o of the variance in the level of flows of FDI between trend changes could
be accounted for by GNP (1960), the type of trend change (a dummy variable) and
a composite index of government instability (with a negative sign). Of the three,
GNP was clearly the most powerful explanator.
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While Thunnel's results are very Interesting, they must be regarded as
quite tentative. Problems of comparability, both with regards to source (U.S.
vs. European investment) and host countries required a number of separate
analyses. Second, the absence (with the exception noted above) of statistical
analysis makes it impossible to evaluate the significance of the results. One
simply does not know how large the ratios must be to be tieaningful and their
range is often quite limited.
In a cross-sectional (1965-67) study across 62 countries, Kobrin [35]
analyzed the relationship between U.S. manufacturing FDI and a number of economic,
social and political environmental variables. The dependent variable was the
number of new subsidiaries established from 1964-67 as reported by the Harvard
Study. Using factor analysis, 33 environmental indicators were reduced to six
aggregate indices: socio-economic development, market size, market growth, a
measure of generalized political instability, government change, and armed anti-
regime activity. In addition, a seventh variable measuring prior export Involveme
was Introduced.
Flows of manufacturing FDI were then regressed on the seven environmental
variables. For the entire group of countries, the seven variables accounted for
64% of the variance of FDI; however only market size, growth and prior export
Involvement were significant at the .05 level. Across a subgroup of 48 LDCs, the
environmental variables accounted for 58% of the variance of FDI. Again, only
the three market related variables and socio-economic development v«re signifi-
cant at the .05 level. Results were not affected by an attempt to control for
market size.
•\,
i
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In a second paper, Kobrin f36j . •
.argues that the relationship between political conflict and FDI is both complex
and Indirect; that political conflict has the highest probability of effecting
»
foreign Investors when it is of a nature, and occurs under conditions, which
are likely to result in relevant changes in goverrjnent policy. Specifically,
conflict is seen as more likely to result in constraints on investors if: the
conflict represents a focused and real threat to regime stability, the conflict
t c J"
Is motivated by economic discontent and the government possesses the administrativt
.capacity to implement constraints.
The model is tested across a group of 48 LDCs. First, flows of manufacturing
Of- c > -
FPI (Harvard data) are regressed upon potential market related determinants which
2
are exogenous to the model (r « .65). The residual of that regression, repre-
senting variations from the amount of FDI one would expect based upon market
related factors above, is then used as the dependent variable. Second, three
measures of conflict are obtained via factor analysis of a larger number of
variables. Last, cross tabulations and ordinal measures of association are used
to analyze the relationship between the dependent variable and indicators of
conflict,controlling for levels of socio-economic development and administrative
capacity.
. Results are consistent with the model posited. A significant relationship
c n a r. i -
l8_ established between flows of FDI (controlled for market related factors) and
an Index of focused anti-regime violence (coups, revolutions, et«.) Furthermore,
that relationship is Intensified (i.e. stronger) at higher levels of development
(where, presumeably the conflict is more likely to be economically motivated) and
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when administrative capacity Is greater. No relationship vzas established for
the other two Indices of conflict; general turmoil and large scale non-focused
violence.
Given our extensive discussion of the affect of the political environment
on foreign investors, it is clear that all of the studies summarized have
several glaring defects. First, they all focus upon instability when it is
clear that political Instability is neither a necessary nor a aufficlent condition
for changes in policy relevant to foreign Investment. Second, they all utilize
aggregate (typically cross-national) analysis when the risk posed by politics is
markedly affected by Industry, firm and even project specific factors. (This
problem is somewhat alleviated by the focus of most of the studies on the manu-
facturing sector.) Last, all the studies entail major data and methodological
problems, which to be fair, are inherent in this type of analysis.
Given these rather significant caveats, what can be said of the results?
Clearly, political factors are not the major determinant of FDI. As would be
expected, the overwhelmingly important determinant of manufacturing investment
is the size and potential of the market [20], [35], [61]. In fact, no relation-
|
ship could be established between any sort of general notion of political
instability and stocks or flows of FDI. (Knickerbocker did find a relationship
between an environmental index and entry concentration.) The only significant
statistical relationships involved either regime lnstabilitv/52 and 6lJ or focused
anti-regime violence [36]. Both Thunnel and Kobrln [36] suggest that the
relationship is Indirect; instability is oniy important to the extent it motivates
either positive or negative, changes in government policy.
31.
V. The Political Environment: Assessment and Response
Surveys of managerial assessment and evaluation of the political
environment conducted over the past fifteen years consistently reveal an interesting
paradox. With very few exceptions, managers rate political instability (or
political risk) as one of the major influences on the foreign investment decision.
Yet, again with very few exceptions, the same surveys report the absence of any
formal or even rigorous and systematic assessment of political environments and/
or their potential impact upon the firm.
Two early studies reported the perceived Importance of "political stability"
to investors. Basi [5] found that executives ranked stability first and market
potential second of 15 potential determinants of the foreign investment decision.
Similarly, after interviewing
managers In 38 firms, Aharoni [1] concluded, "(A)ll the respondents asserted as
a matter of course that the first thing they considered was political and economic
stability," p. 13. A second conclusion of Aharoni's described the assessment
process: "Risk is not described in terms of the Impact on a specific investment.
It Is rather described in general terms and stems from ignorance, generalizations,
projection of U.S. culture and standards to other countries and on unqualified
deduction from some general indicator to a specific investment," p. 94. As we
shall see, little can be found In reports of more recent surveys to support a
challenge to Aharoni' s conclusions.
Several other important studies were conducted (or reported) in the late
1960's. In 1966 Root surveyed executives in a large number of U.S. firms selected
from the Fortune 500 list relying on both a mailed questionnaire and personal
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Interviews. He reported [49] that while executives Indicated political risks
and market opportunities to be "...the dominant factors in most (foreign)
Investment decisions ... no executive offered any evidence of a systematic
e-zaluation of political risks, involving their identification, their likely
incidence, and their specific consequences for company operations," p. 75.
In a second paper [48] Root reported a survey (of the same group of firms)
which explored executives perceptions of political and business climates. The
results were quite clear; executives subjective perceptions of political
instability were highly Instrumental in shaping their attitudes towards the
safety and profitability of Investment opportunities. Stable governments with
a positive attitude towards the U.S. were closely associatad with profitable,
high potential, invesmtment climates.
A 1967-68 survey of investors in twelve countries conducted by the Conference
Board [43] confirmed earlier findings of Aharoni [1] and Root [48]. First, estlma
of political risk were typically based upon subjective perceptions. "The study
makes it clear that obstacles to investment exist in the mind of the investor . .
.
certain countries are dismissed from consideration as Investment sites on the
basis of information that is Incomplete, outdated or in some cases even erroneous,
p. 2. Second, politics is perceived as an Important determinant of foreign
Investment. Thus, a common response to perceived political risk is avoidance:
"A great many investors eliminated countries -. and even whole geographic regions'
from their Investment consideration for political reasons," p. 3.
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Three studies reported in the early seventies are of interest. Piper As"}
reviewed 16 pre- investment surveys for food processing enterprises in Latin
America conducted under the AID fifty/fifty program. He identified 38 decision
variables and concluded that social and political factors were generally of
minimal concern. The surveys concentrated on technical and engineering,
financial and economic factors. However, when evaluating Piper's results,
one must note that the surveys he reviewed are all associated with decisions
not to invest and his attempts to redress this bias were not successful.
Swansbrough / 59J utilized mailed questionnaires to survey 212 U.S. investors
in Latin America during 1970. Three political or perhaps quasi-political factors
were ranked as the most important problems confronting U.S. investors in Latin
'America. Specifically, 88% of respondents ranked "restrictive economic policies"
as of high or medium importance, 867, did so for "political instability" and 657=
for "hostility to private enterprise." Zink's r66j conclusions, based on a
mail survey of 187 U.S. manufacturing multinations were again consistent with
previous studies. He found that while politics in LDCs had become a major
concern of the executives surveyed, U.S. companies had not (with few exceptions)
developed techniques for forecasting political change or identifying political
phenomena that might prove detrimental.
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Two recent, and related. Conference Board reports are monotonously
consistent with previous findings.
The first [37] focuses upon U.S. multinationals operating in Canada and
Italy and is based upon interviews with managers and home and host country
officials. The authors found that 1) little attention is paid to political
analysis, 2) parent companies do not appear to value political reporting, 3)
any political analysis which transcends superficial impressions tends to be
concentrated at times of entering or leaving a country, and A) "... not enough
serious attention has been paid to the utility of incorporating political analysis
Into decision making," pp.79 and 80.
The second study [38] incorporates findings from non-U. S. MNCs and widened
the geographic area of interest to include Brazil and Nigeria. The authors
found widespread (although not universal) agreement that host country environ-
mental analysis was becoming increasingly Important, and that firms' capability
to undertake such analysis needed improvement. However, after reviewing the
kind of information a manager might find useful, they conclude that while some
sort of environmental analysis exists in most all firms, it is typically rather
loose and casual, developing and utilizing a subjective "feel for the political
situation."
During the course of the study, various planning materials and documents
were reviewed. The conclusion drawn is to the point: "It is here that one can
best appreciate the relatively superficial quality of most environmental analysis
More often nmu not, the few paragraphs devoted to a host country's social and
political dynamics is not better than one might find in leading parent company
newspapers," p. 65. Interestingly.the authors found that for every page of enviroi
mental data in planning documents, there was likely to be twenty pages of economi
data analysis.
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Drawing on his experience as a Vice-President of a major bank, Van Agtmael
[57] concludes that even large and active MNCs do not analyze political risk in
a very sophisticated manner and that they do not always identify various types
of risk and relate them to specific business operations. He agrees with other
authors that the typical response to political risk is avoidance, "Even those
corporations which have made commitments overseas, by and large, try to avoid
political risk by investing in 'safe* countries," p. 26.
We have not reviewed one, somewhat specialized, area of the political
environment assessment literature; that dealing with the soverign risk inherent
in private bank lending to LDCs. While that topic has generated a good deal
of recent attention, it would appear that the conclusions presented above apply
equally well to banks. Rather than extend, what is already a rather lengthy
paper, we would refer the interested reader to the following: Goodman [18],
Mueller [42], Van Agtmael [63] and Yassukouich [65].
Last, we would like to briefly review the findings of the literature on
managers' sources of information about politics. Again, the earliest findings
still stand. In a classic study, which while dealing primarily with trade
certainty has broader implications, Bauer, de Sola Pool and Dexter [6] concluded
that, to businessmen, knowledge of the "outside world" came in a number of ways:
"It came in part through the printed word, but what came that way was
surprisingly general and unfocused. Our respondents read Time , Business
Week , The Wall Street Journal . The New York Times , and other such journals.
They read a great deal. They also read trade papers. But, in making
specific business decisions, they did not do research in published sources.
... Knowledge of foreign economic affairs came either from the roost
general news sources or, more vividly, from correspondence and personal
experience," p. 470.
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In his survey of manufacturing MNCs, Zink 66 found that managers' major
sources of political information were reports from host-country employees,
general news sources and financial institutions (in that order). Only 237o of
respondents considered internal political staff as an important source and only
67% so rated outside consultants on a continuous retainer.
After interviewing fifty managers in the headquarters of 13 U.S. MNCs,
Keegan 30 concluded that his study emphasized "... how little the systematic
methods of information scanning have become a part of the way in which executives
learn about their business environments," p. 420. Executives stationed abroad
(but not lower employees), banks and the public press were the most important
sources of information for headquarters managers.
Again, in summarizing this segment of the literature a cautionary statement
is necessary; most results should be taken as tentative. Much of the evidence is
annecdotal in nature and most, if not virtually all, of the data results from non
probabilistic surveys. However, findings of the studies reviewed above are im-
pressively consistent.
First, it is clear that managers consider political instability and/or
political risk, typically quite loosely defined, to be an important factor in
the foreign investment decision. Second, It is just as clear that rigorous
and systematic assessment and evaluation of the political environment is ex-
ceptional. Most political analysis is both superficial and subjective and not
integrated formally into the decision making process. It would appear that the
resulting subjective perceptions of "political instability" are equated on almost
a one to one basis with a poor investment climate. The response frequently is
avoidance; firms simply do not get involved in countries or even regions, they
perceive to be risky. Last, managers appear to rely primarily on internal (to
the firm) sources for environmental information. Wlien they look for outside
data, they are most likely to go to their banks or the general and business
media.
37.
VI. Environmental Assessment Methodologies
While this paper will not deal with the management of the political
environment, we will briefly review several examples of existing assessment or
screening methodologies. However, we will not discuss models designed to assess
Soverlgn Risk (i.e. that associated with loans to governments or government
agencies) or examples of specific companies' screening procedures.
Existing screening models fit into two general categories; those aggregating
subjective assessments (typically via a delphi method) and those relying on
quantified indicators of ecenomic, social and political factors. (A "soft/hard"
distinction Is not appropriate.) The best known examples of the former are
Haner's "Business Environmental Risk Index" or BERI [25 and 26] and the Business
International Index of Environmental Risk [10], Both attempt to assess the
general investment climate in a number of countries by using the Delphi technique
to poll a panel of experts. Haner [26] states that the objective of BERI is to
assess the business environment in a country from the viewpoint of a foreign
investor six months to one year in the future.
BERI' 8 panel assess fifteen environmental factors (quarterly) including:
"political stability," attitude towards foreign Investors, inflation, economic
growth, balance of payments, communications, etc. Each panelist scores each
factor on a zero to four scale, and the responses are than ag?regated with the factors
not equally weighted (e.g. stability at 2.5, inflation 1.5 and communications 1).
The aggregate index and political, operations and financial subindices are avail-
able. The BI system is similar with political-legal-social, commerical and monetary
financial factors scored, weighted and aggregated. For example, panelists are
asked to score "government intervention in business" as follows: a) free enter-
prise system (8), b) limited controls (6), c) strong but selective intervention (4),
d) lightly controlled economy (2).
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While both Indices are at least attempts to systematically screen the
environment, their usefulness Is somewhat limited. First, they provide "holistic"
rankings which are Inherently Independent of f<rm or industry factors. More
Importantly, they rely on a panel who may differ widely not only in terms of
rankings, but in how they conceptualize the phenomena being evaluated (e.g.
"instability"). The weightings are obviously subjective, and again, may not
be relevant to a given firm. Last, at least in the case of BERI, panel selection
is a function of who Haner knows, and more recently, who each original panelist
knows. While most are non-U. S. nationals, they also tend to be employees of
Industrial firms of financial Institutions. Thus, while their expertise is not
questioned, their fundamental viewpoints are not likely to differ greatly from
the users of the service. The net result is, as Haner himself notes [24], that
the index cannot forcast sudden changes in the political and economic environment..
Again, however, both indices may be useful for general pre-screenlng.
A second set of methodologies utilize quantitative indices. Several authors,
for example, review existing indicators (or models) of political instability.
Thus Green and Korth [21] discuss three existing indices in terms of the conditior
under which managers would find each useful. Smith [56] assumes that the relatior
ships between power elites and their constituents are crucial and then operatlon-
alizes Gurr's relative deprivation model to predict those relationships.
There have also been several attempts to develop more sophisticated quantita-
tive indices of political risk. For example, Haendel and West [24] suggest what
they call the Political System Stability Index (PSSI) which is composed of
fifteen Indicators of the system's stability/adaptability. The PSSI is comprised
of three subindlces: socio-economic (e.g. fractionallzation, growth GNP/capltal)
,
governmental processes (e.g. legislative effectiveness, constitutional changes),
and societal conflict. The latter is, in turn, an aggregate of three indices:
I
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public unrest (e.g. riots, crises), internal violence (e.g. armed attacks,
coups) and coercion potential (internal security forces per capita). A score
and an estimate of confidence in that score (1-5) are provided for the overall
index and each of the three major sub- indices. PSSI scores, which are based
upon Z scores and thus relative to one another, have been developed for 65
LDCs.
Rumrael and Heenan /53 / suggest integrating qualitative assessments (re-
liance on "old hands," delphi techniques, etc.) with quantitative assessments.
As an example, they utilize multivariate analysis to predict two components
of intrastate conflict -- turmoil and rebellion — in Indonesia through 1980.
Juhl / 29| compares a number of environmental indicators, including four
measures of political instability and BERI. The results are of interest.
First, while the relationships (rank order correlation), between the various
indices are typically significant, they are rather weak. Second, none of
them account for more than 257o of the variance of any of three indices of
nationalization. Last, with one exception, the author could not establish
a significant relationship between the BERI Nationalism sub- index and flows
of FBI.
While recognizing the inherent limits of aggregate quantitative analysis -
as with the delphi techniques, it ignores industry and firm specific factors -
we believe that it offers a great deal of potential as a basis for systematic
and rigorous assessment of the political environment. (We are not suggesting
that it can now, or at any point in the future, be utilized independent of
qualitative judgements.) However, in spite of the fact that most of the methodo-
logies discussed were developed to aid in international firms' assessment of the
political environment, they still measure political instability rather than the
potential impact of politics upon the firm.
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As we will note In the last section of this paper, this problem transcends
that of Index development. While most authors reviewed agree that political
Instability and political risk are distinct phenomenon, the fact of the matter
is that we do not really know a great deal about how the former (and the political
environment in general) affects the latter.
41.
VII. Conclusions ,
In a real sense, the focus of this paper has been on decision making
under uncertainty. Specifically, uncertainty about the impact of the poli-
tical environment upon the international firm.
Managers have available, and apparently use, a wide variety of tech-
niques to reduce and cope with uncertainty in many areas of business oper-
ations. Most firms, for example, would not even consider basing a major
new product introduction on a generalized "feel" for the market. Rather
they typically utilize a battery of relatively sophisticated research tech-
niques to aid in reaching a judgment about both the product's potential and
how to market it. Yet, judgments about the impact of politics upon opera-
tions appear, at least from the sources reviewed in this paper, to be rather
superficial and typically based almost entirely on subjective perceptions.
To be absolutely clear, we not equating "sophisticated analysis" with a
complex mathematical model. Rather, we simply mean a systematic and relatively
rigorous approach to data gathering and problem solving. While stereotypes
are admittedly unfair, the all too typical process where political "instab-
ility" is equated with a poor investment climate and the market avoided, is
a long way from that ideal.
The literature reviewed in this paper reflects the substantial growth and
development of a relatively new area. However, we must conclude that some fairly
major gaps must be filled if it is to contribute to more systematic and rigorous
assessment and evaluation of politics by managers of international fi.. _ and to
the effective integration of that information into the decision making process.
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The lacunae that exist are both conceptual and empirical. We need better I
definitions of the phenomena, a conceptual structure relating politics to the
firm and a great deal of information about the Impact of the political
environment. The three are, of course, related. j
We will not attempt to neatly redefine the concept of political risk.
Rather we will attempt to set some bounds about the area of concern. First,
however, we should like to make a, probably futile, suggestion, that the term
"political risk" be dropped from usage. It is both overly confining and
confusing; one is never clear whether it refers to business risk, risk as
opposed to uncertainty, risk in terms of a "chance of a loss," or perhaps even
systematic or unsystematic risk.
In the simplest possible terms we are interested in the current and potential
Impact (s) of the political environment upon the operations of the firm where:
1. The political environment is circumscribed in terms of events which,
however they are manifest, are motivated by or have as their objective
^, . or authoritythe maintenance or modification of power^ relationships at the governmental
level, and
2. The impact upon the firm is defined in terms of both effects upon the
magnitude of cash flows or returns and upon the business risk associated
with them in the context of a specific project.
Under conditions approximating certainty, political events will effect only
the magnitude of cash flows. Under conditions approximating objective uncertainty
(i.e. probabilities are known), political events will effect both the expected
value of cash flows and their potential distribution. Under conditions of bounded
subjective uncertainty (probabilities are not known), the political environment
will effect both expected values and risk. However, in this case risk is a functid
of both uncertainty and an Inability to directly perceive that uncertainty in
terms of the actual probabilities associated with events.
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First, of cash flows
Two further points should be clear, expected values and the business risk
associated with them are properties of the firm. The political events we are
concerned with are properties of the environment. Understanding the nature of
the transboundary link (environment/firm) is thus crucial. Second, the impact of
the political environment is industry, firm and even project specific.
Last, we would like to briefly suggest some areas where additional research
might be focused.
1. Empirical analyses of the conditions under which, and the process
through which, political events effect the firm . Most of the
studies reviewed in section IV examine simple relationships between
flows of investment and political events. It is clear, that what
ever relationship exists is both indirect and complex. Thus,
further work (both theoretical and empirical) is needed to identify
the types of environmental events likely to affect operations, the
conditions under which they are most likely to do so and the nature
of the specific process by which they do so.
2. More data on the "effects" themselves . Aside from some limited data
on nationalization we really know very little about the relative
importance of actual constraints imposed upon firms. Have, for example,
pressures for local ownership, exchange controls, direct limits on
operations, or restrictions on fees and royalties resulted
from political change and how have they effected firms?
3. Additional and more systematic studies of the assessment and evaluation
of the political environment by multinational firms . What factors
affect the way the assessment and evaluation process is organized and
executed? Where is it located in the organization? How is the
resulting information integrated into decision making? Importantly,
how does the process affect strategic decision making? Are there
industrial or national differences? What affects managers subjective
perceptions of political environments? How does information act upon
them?
44.
4. In depth case studies . Most of the research described in this
paper is quantitative and cross-national. While it has been a
valuable aid in mapping out the nature of relationships between
variables, thorough case studies are needed to flesh out the
skeleton. For example, a case study of the impact of a deter-
iorating political environment (Argentina in the late 1960s) on
foreign investors could aid in understanding the exact nature
of the impact of political events on foreign firms. Case studies
could also help compensate for the lack of timeseries data.
5. Interdisciplinary research . Work in this area definitionally
implies that one draw upon previous efforts in both management
and political science. However, it is clear that efforts in-
volving a number of the social sciences such as economics, organ-
izational psychology and anthropology are likely to bear fruit.
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Footnotes
1. I would like to thank Gene Carter, Joseph LaPolombara, Donald Lessard,
Bernard Mennis, Stewart Myers, David Parker, Franklin Root and Gerald
West for their criticism of my ideas and/or earlier drafts of this
paper. I suspect, that in more than one instance, they would consider
their efforts less than succesaful.
2. As Baglini rilj notes, the political event is a cause of loss or a "peril."
3. Bernard Mennis brought this point to my attention.
4. For a discussion of "economic nationalism" see Harry Johnson, "A Theoretical
Model of Economic Nationalism in New and Developing States," Political
Science Quarterly 80 (June 1965): 169-185.
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